## CRITICAL RESOURCE

# Getting socio-political due diligence right

Seven deadly sins in companies' approaches to assessing political and stakeholder challenges



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## Critical Resource: overview





What we do

 We work with clients to achieve their commercial goals by understanding and resolving potential stakeholder challenges

Who we are

 Team of global and country experts, with a track record at some of the world's most politically-complex resource projects



#### Our senior advisory panel:

**Lord Browne** – former CEO of BP



**Prof Sir Paul Collier** – global authority on resources & development



#### Why companies turn to us:


- Sole focus on extractives
- Rigour: industry-leading toolkit, methodologies, database of 200+ projects
- Knowledge: world-leading experts in resource issues and politics in over 75 countries
- Credibility: established relationships with investors, NGOs, SRIs, IFIs etc.

## *LicenseSecure*: a uniquely-rigorous methodology



*LicenseSecure* : a methodology developed by Critical Resource for assessing stakeholder, political and reputational risk at the asset level

- Database of 250+ assets (and growing) provides **global scope**, and many comparison projects
- 150+ indicators cover **full range of risks** (e.g., political, social, environmental, fiscal)
- AAA-D rating succinct benchmarking tool for **rapid comparison** of project risk
- Scoring based on 6 categories covering both external risk and strength of mitigation by company management



#### We use the LicenseSecure scale to benchmark an asset's overall 'socio-political license to operate'

**73% of delays** to world's largest 190 oil and gas projects due to 'above ground' risk (*Goldman Sachs, 2009*) Social conflicts can lead to losses of **~\$20m a week** at major \$multi-bn mining projects (*Harvard University, 2011*)

#### Anglo American: Minas Rio, Brazil



- Intended as a transformative acquisition
- Delivered late and over budget (\$ 8.4 bn) in part because of under-estimation of complexity of regulatory and land acquisition processes





- Rio Tinto paid **\$4.2 billion** for Riversdale Mining in 2011
- Government veto of barging, combined with technical problems, resulted in Rio selling for just \$50m in 2014

#### Petrobras: Block 31 'Yasuni' Ecuador



- In 2002 Petrobras purchased licenses in Yasuni National Park investing US\$200 million
- After sustained environmental opposition, government made work within Yasuni illegal. Petrobras was forced to return the block

## Mistake #1: Taking a simplistic country-level view

• Focusing solely on national-level risks neglects asset-specific, or regional, risks – as well as opportunities.



- A post-acquisition review for a client in Peru, showed the company had over-looked important local dynamics.
- While the national and regional governments were supportive, the influential local mayor was significantly opposed.



## Mistake #2: Failing to anticipate political shifts

• Politicians and/or personal relationships between key political figures or interest groups and company personnel can change – surprisingly quickly.



- Repsol acquired a majority stake in YPF while the company enjoyed good relations with President Nestor Kirchner.
- But Argentina expropriated Repsol's stake in 2012 under Christina Fernandes.



- A mining project in Central America failed to plan for alternative outcomes in presidential elections.
- When the opposition candidate won – against expectations – it had to quickly build relationships and broaden its intelligence gathering.

## Mistake #3: Being 'self-centred' and unable to understand dynamics between stakeholders

• Failure to 'get' stakeholders who don't share a company's perspective, or to understand relationships or rivalries *between* stakeholders can blind companies to key issues.



- As part of its due diligence, a company looking to acquire an asset in Latin America met with supportive government officials and community members handpicked by the vendor.
- It failed to pick up deep community opposition and struggled to manage resistance leading to costly delays.



- Community jealousies at the Tintaya mine in Peru – which began under a previous owner – led to persistent disruption as rival groups have sought competing benefit packages.
- Under Xstrata's ownership problems persisted. Glencore is now in the process of closing the mine.

## Mistake #4: Underestimating legacy issues

• Local environmental damage or legacy of poor relationships can haunt acquirers, with opposed or predatory attitudes already entrenched.



- Gabriel Resources has spent \$100s of millions at Rosia Montana project since 1999.
- The company failed to understand concerns over cyanide and has struggled with NGO and political opposition.



- Acquisition of the Cerrejon coal mine was dogged by issues from poorly-handled community resettlement.
- Current owners have sought to address negative social impacts. But there is still resentment locally and active campaigns internationally.

# Mistake #5: Missing opportunities to turn around 'diamonds in the rough'

 Assessing only the risks posed by external factors without looking at mitigation strategies means companies can miss potential opportunities.



- An oil company was awarded a concession in a political context considered initially too 'hot to handle'.
- Implementing a proactive political risk management strategy enabled it to secure a successful farm-in with an international investor.



- Bougainville Copper Ltd's mine has remained closed since 1989: local grievances escalated into a civil war in PNG.
- The mine could present a major opportunity for a new owner (albeit an extremely risky one).

## Mistake #6: The 'Year Zero' mentality

- Post-acquisition, purchasers often look to transplant new external affairs teams and processes, or to review commitments previously given.
- Delays or changes to project plans can undermine support from government or communities.



• Local communities engaged in disruptive direct action against former owners due to unrealistic expectations.



 The new owner is having to navigate this challenge, in tandem with reviewing generous social investment pledges.

## Mistake #7: Allowing deal excitement to exclude political factors

- In the throes of thrashing out a commercially compelling opportunity, companies can sometimes be seduced by supposedly incontrovertible legal advice but forget that political considerations play a key role.



- BHP Billiton experienced political backlash when it bid for Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan in 2011.
- Provincial government believed the deal would not provide sufficient benefit to the region.



### **Potash**Corp

- **bhp**billiton
- The federal government blocked the \$39bn deal, and BHP was left nursing transaction costs of \$350m.

This followed an earlier block by regulators of a tie-up between BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto's iron ore assets.



To learn more about Critical Resource and how we can help, please contact us:

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